1976 966 Resolution - Laserfiche WebLink

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does not authorize Council to request legal action be brought on its behalf against the Mayor. The authority under which Mr. Orkin would be.retained by Council restricts him to the discharge of "legislative duties". It should also be apparent that R.996 does not authorize compensation for special counsel's fees for litigation. The Law Director, prior to enactment of R. 966, advised Council that it lacked authority under the Charter to enact a valid ordinance or resolution in the absence of submission of such legislation to the Mayor for his approval or veto. In addition to the Charter, the Law Director's statement conforms with an Opinion rendered by Judge Krenzler in the.case of State, ex rel. City Cotm.cil v. Board (1974) 40 0 App 2d 99. The Judge's Opinion clearly states that where a Charter requires the mayor to approve an ordinance or . resolution within a period of days after its adoption, the Mayor cannot be deprived of the authority by Council. At page 304 of his Opinion, Judge Krentzler stated: "In the present case, Ordinance 443-74 was not a validly enacted Ordinance because-all of the fore, going procedural steps were not followed. The ordinance was enacted March 4, 1974 by a vote of 23-8...but it was never submitted to the Mayor for approval or veto." The right of the Ma.yor to veto all ordinances or resolutions cannot be withdrawn from the Ma.yor by Council. A mandate of the peaple requires the Mayor to express his approval or disapproval of legi.slation. The Ma:yor's duty is not a mere ministerial act but a legislative act. This approval must be active and direct, showing positive official concurrence in the matter or exercising the right of veto. - 3-